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Introduction
The number of deaths caused by medical errors is equivalent to three jumbo jets crashing every two days -Lucian L. Leape
Medical errors or preventable medical adverse events (PMAES) constitute one of the leading health concerns in the United States. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) estimates that PMAES cause between 44,000 and 98,000 U.S. deaths each year. 1 Additionally, PMAES result in 1.6 million serious injuries and cost $29 billion in lost wages and health care expenses. 2 Department of Defense (DoD) healthcare facilities are not immune from PMAES. One study estimated that there are more than 15,000 medical errors committed in the 200 military healthcare facilities each year. 3 The Office of the United States Air Force (USAF) Surgeon General processes between 250 and 300 malpractice cases annually. 4 Researchers have found a number of causes of PMAES. 5 Among them are poorly designed equipment, inadequately trained medical providers, and simple negligence. 6 However, the leading cause of PMAES is poor communication among healthcare providers. 7, 8 The medical community has long recognized that communication among healthcare providers is poor, and solving this problem is essential to improving patient safety. 9 Unfortunately, few researchers have studied medical team communication and PMAES. 10 The limited research available has significant shortcomings. For example, some researchers have examined communication in the workplace, but they did not directly link communication problems to PMAES. Others studies used observers. These observers documented poor communication and PMAES, but observers understandably intervened before a patient was harmed. Unfortunately, the presence of observers may influence results. 11 Additionally, observers may have intervened even though the staff might have discovered the error themselves before causing harm. 12 These studies also often lump a broad range of behaviors into the category of "communication" without further defining the construct. In other words, they failed to adequately identify a set of behaviors that constitute the problem.
This study addressed these shortcomings. First, it looked at actual PMAES by examining a random sample of medical malpractice cases and medical incident investigations from USAF healthcare facilities. Second, problems with communication were clearly defined and categorized into three specific barriers.
In this study communication problems were present in most PMAES. It also showed that problems with decoding and encoding information, team member status differences, and times pressures and workload were barriers to effective communication among medical team members.
Research Questions
Four questions guided this research. They were:
What is the prevalence of communication problems in PMAES?
2. Are problems with encoding and decoding written and/or oral information a key factor that contributes to PMAES?
What is the relationship between team hierarchal status and PMAES?
4. What is the relationship between time pressures/workload and PMAES?
Definitions
Two terms may need clarification. The first is preventable medical adverse events or PMAES. Note that the abbreviation PMAE is used when referring to a single preventable medical adverse event. The medical literature contains several terms to describe medical errors such as iatrogenic injury, mistake, and negligence. This paper uses PMAES for several reasons. PMAES delineates preventable versus unpreventable events since some medical adverse events are clearly unpreventable. For instance, if a patient has an adverse reaction to a drug they have never previously taken, this is an unpreventable adverse event. Also not all medical errors are PMAES. For example, a patient may be given the wrong medication by mistake, a medical error. However, the medication may have no effect on the patient, and therefore, this incident is not an adverse event. Several of the cited works use the term "medical error." To retain integrity with these works, the
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Communication between healthcare professionals is a mess.
-John Gosbee
The Problem They argued that the study's screening criteria was flawed, and consequently, the numbers were exaggerated. 9 Leape countered that the numbers were not only accurate but also underestimated. 10 He argued that because many events are not recorded in medical records, and that autopsies reveal 20 to 40 of patients die with undiagnosed but serious illness, the number of PMAES may be twice as high.
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In addition, Leape's research only looked at inpatient adverse events. Although the majority of PMAES occur in this setting, some occur in primary care. Fisher, Fetters, Munro, and Goldman found an adverse rate of 3.7 per 100,000 outpatient clinic visits of which 14 percent suffered serious injury and 3 percent died. 12 Additionally, fewer than five percent of medical errors are ever reported. 13 Therefore, PMAES may be even higher.
Another argument against PMAE studies is that medicine deals with "sick" people, many of whom have serious illnesses. The death rates in medicine are somewhat understandable considering the situation of many of the patients. Leape even admits that patient acuity is increasing. 14 However, the fallacy of this argument is that the underlying problem is not death rates, but error rates. The Harvard Medical Study found that 4 percent of hospitalized patients experience an adverse event. 15 The IOM report and others have compared this error rate to other "high risk"
industries such as nuclear power and aviation. The error rates in these industries are well below 1 percent. In fact, the chances of being injured in an aviation mishap are 1 in 8 million flight compared to medicine where the rate is 2,640 per 100,000. 16, 17 The IOM report endorses adopting principles of aviation safety and applying them to medicine.
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What Causes PMAES?
The traditional approach to understanding PMAES is to identify offenders and assign blame.
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In other words, adverse events are often perceived as nothing more than individual negligence. However, modern medicine is rarely about one individual taking care of another individual. 20 Today a patient enters a healthcare system, and this system treats his or her illness. A team of physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers work together to provide care.
Today's approach to understanding PMAES is not on the individual but on breakdowns in the complex medical system. 21 Specifically for this study, it is hypothesized that PMAES are often by caused problems in the human medical systemthe medical team. 
Communication and Teamwork in Medicine
Elements of Communication
These studies indicate that communication problems are a major contributor to medical errors. The problem is that while they have identified the problem as a lack of communication, they failed to address the underlying causes of the problem. In this section, three possible causes of the problems of communication in medicine are discussed-problems with encoding and decoding information, team hierarchical structure, and time pressures.
These three barriers were chosen for two reasons. First, the IOM report mentions these barriers as possible causes of PMAES. 36 Leape also argues that time pressures and poorly written records may contribute to mistakes. The IOM report argued that a similar program might help save lives in medicine.
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Several CRM programs for medicine are currently being used. 40 Since the aviation industry's safety improvement programs are held as an example for the medical industry, using some aviation safety principles for this study makes sense.
Encoding and Decoding of Information
Communication at its most basic element is a process of information transfer from one person to another. Ivancevich and Matteson define communication as the "transition of information and understanding through the use of common symbols" (italics in original). 41 The most widely used model of communication involves six steps. First, communicators come up with information or an idea they wish to convey to another.
They assemble their ideas into verbal or nonverbal symbols (or encode them) and send them to someone else. The message is sent via a medium, such as a telephone, policy statement or face-to-face communication. The receiver then decodes the message.
Decoding is symbolic interpretation and, of course, subject to the receiver's own thought processes. Finally, in effective communication processes, feedback is given to the original communicator. The entire system is surrounded by "noise" that threatens to distort the information. "Noise" can literally be noise, but it is more likely to involve barriers to communication, such as time pressures or superior-subordinate problems.
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A survey of more than 1,000 physicians and nurses revealed that encoding and decoding information was a significant concern. 43 The healthcare providers reported the majority of communication in their facility was either unclear or not given to the appropriate party. It was interesting to note that physicians and nurses had different perceptions of the levels of communication. Although physicians perceived themselves as having more communication training than nurses, nurses ranked "the doctor using better communication skills" as the top difficulty in obtaining needed information about a patient. This study admittedly had some shortcomings. It relied upon subjective selfassessments rather than direct observations, and the data was collected from only one hospital. More importantly for the current study, the researchers did not examine the relationship between encoding and decoding problems and patient safety. 44 Coiera and Tombs conducted an observational study of medical teams in a community hospital. 45 They found numerous examples of inefficient team communications. They offered this specific example. "A senior consultant tried to transfer a patient to another's team by delegating the request, involving at least two intermediaries. By the time the second consultant received the message it was substantially distorted and had the potential to endanger the patient." 46 The following case from Avery also highlights the problem with encoding and decoding information between physicians from different specialties. 47 The case began when the patient consulted a gastroenterologist for abdominal pain. After the physician's initial work-up was negative, the gastroenterologist sent the patient for a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan. The ensuing conversation between the physician and the radiologist was confusing. While the radiologist noted multiple abnormalities, her conclusion was that the examination was "essentially within normal limits." After a lengthy conversation and written report, the patient's physician interpreted the radiologist's diagnosis as "no finding," while the radiologist thought the results were inconclusive. A year later a new physician discovered the patient had lymphoma. After reviewing the CAT scan, he concluded this was an extension of a disease that was evident on the original scan.
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These final two examples show that misinterpretation of information can be catastrophic. However, they are anecdotal, and no specific study of problems involving encoding and decoding has been conducted.
Team Hierarchical Structure
Medicine has numerous hierarchical structures. First, there is a hierarchy based upon occupation. Physicians have historically been placed above nurses in this hierarchy and registered nurses over less qualified nurses. Helmreich and Merritt observed, "All physician groups have higher status than surgical or anesthesia nurses and do not hesitate to invoke their authority." 49 Even into the 1970s, nurses at many facilities were expected to stand and give their seats to physicians during staff meetings. There is also a hierarchy based upon medical specialty. Surgeons are perceived to hold the highest level while general practitioners arguably hold the lowest. 50 Finally, status is based upon position.
In some residency programs, the length of coat that a physician wears further indicates their position. For example, interns will have the shortest white coats while attending physicians have the longest. 51 Team hierarchical structures or status differences affect communication on several levels.
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Those higher on the structure may disregard the inputs of "subordinates" because they perceive a credibility gap. 53 Subordinates may also filter information in order to avoid conflict. 54 According to Ivancevich The evidence supports the conclusion that the hierarchical structure of medicine is a significant barrier to communication. The IOM report recommended that medicine must "develop a working culture in which communication flows freely regardless of authority gradient." 64 However, prior research fails to adequately link the hierarchy with PMAES.
Time Pressures and Workload
Time pressures and provider workload are the final barriers to effective communication. Time pressure imposes an added dimension to the communication process that may result in information being passed unclearly or significant parties being left out of the channels of communication. 65 Provider workload is interconnected with time pressures. Someone who has too many tasks to accomplish will be pressured for time and may experience work overload.
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Although medical environments are often hurried even chaotic, few studies of time pressures have been conducted. 67 Instead, time pressures and workload appear to be discussed in the context of fatigue and sleep deprivation. 68 Despite strong evidence that these factors contribute to mistakes in other fields, no clear link has been established between fatigue and poor job performance in medicine. 69 Likewise, work overload has been shown to increase errors in non-medical fields. 70 However, in medicine a connection between work overload and errors is suspected but not proven. 
Variables
The study examined problems with encoding and decoding, team hierarchical structure, and time pressures/workload. These variables, or barriers to communication,
were not mutually exclusive as one problem with communication could involve three barriers. The goal of this research, however, was not to distinguish the strength of these variables to each other. Instead the goal was to understand their prevalence in PMAES.
Problems of Encoding and Decoding
Problems of encoding and decoding were defined as information not conveyed clearly. This contained three possible levels. First, verbal information was relayed, but the receiver misunderstood the message. Second, written information was provided, but it was misinterpreted or misread by the reader. Finally, information was available, but the message was not conveyed to other team members. If investigators determined that a medical record should have been available or reviewed, then it was counted towards this variable.
Team Hierarchical Structures
A problem with communication potentially caused by hierarchical structures was the second variable. When records indicated problems with communication, the pattern of the staff interactions was documented. These included combinations of information transferred between physicians, nurses, technicians or others.
Workplace hostility was examined as a sub-variable of team hierarchical structures.
Records were examined to determine whether there were clear indications of hostility in the work place or personal problems between the various medical staff. Only patterns were noted, as it would be overly speculative to conclude that this variable actually caused a PMAE, unless these were findings of the investigators.
Time Pressures and Workload
The final variable examined was time pressures and workload. This variable was noted if the case investigators determined that the medical staff was rushed when the adverse event occurred. This variable also included whether staff was experiencing heavy workload demands or if shift change occurred during the PMAE. Like team hierarchical structure, it is difficult to determine whether time pressures or workload actually caused a PMAE. Therefore, the presence of the variable was noted but no conclusions of causation were made.
Selection
Two selection methods were used for this study. For the malpractice cases, the last thirty cases that were closed in 2001 calendar year were selected. The researcher had no prior knowledge of the cases, and since they were not filed by any particular category, they were essentially randomized. Cases ranged from mild to severe PMAES, and payouts were as low as $3,000 to several million. The MIIs were selected from four drawers. The investigator selected 30 cases at random by blindly selecting from these drawers. Since the cases had blank covers, the investigator had no way of knowing the contents of the folder prior to selection.
Analysis
The researcher used a question format to assess each record (Appendix A). The prevalence of problematic communication was recorded in relation to the three barriers.
After answering these questions, a short summary of each case was developed. As cases were reviewed, special attention was paid to the history of the case and the interviews with the healthcare providers involved in the process. 2 One aspect of this review that surprised this researcher was the degree to which physicians disagreed with each other as to whether the "standard of care" had been met. Often different reviewers reached different conclusions and in one case, when all the reviewers agreed that a settlement was indicated, the USAF Surgeon General cited evidence that supported denying the claim. 3 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 44-119. Clinical Performance Improvement. 4 June 2001. 4 Ibid. 5 Qualitative research methods may be less well known, but when complemented with quantitative methods can yield a much clearer understanding of a phenomenon. Denzin and Lincoln define qualitative research as "multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings that people bring to them." Qualitative research methods were ideal for this study because the researcher reviewed interviews and records. In the end, the results of this study relied to some degree upon the interpretation of this researcher. In addition, other researchers collected the research material. While Notes the quantitative researcher may wince at the "biases" and "subjectivity" of this analysis, the qualitative researcher counters that these terms denote an ontological realism that simply does not exist.
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Problems with Encoding and Decoding
Overall, when problems were noted, providers inaccurately conveyed verbal or written communication in roughly equal amounts. As Table 1 encoding/decoding problems (see Table 1 ). In nine of these cases, the problem with communication involved staff inadequately conveying the status of the patient to other staff members. Two of the cases involved phone calls to other staff members. The staffs disagreed on the content of these conversations in both of these latter cases. In one case, an ER physician repeatedly requested a surgeon come to the hospital to assist with a case.
The surgeon, however, denied that he was ever asked to assist in person. His interpretation was that he was merely being consulted, and the surgeon argued that he provided the appropriate advice. Although it might be easy to conclude that the physicians in this case were attempting to cover their mistakes by blaming each other, the less cynical conclusion was that the ER physician's communication failed to clearly convey the urgency of the case to the surgeon. Ultimately, the 13 year-old patient died in the emergency room. A less dramatic case involved assumptions of language. A physician asked for a test to be conducted "ASAP." He assumed that this meant immediately, but the receiver in the laboratory interpreted this to mean that he could place it behind his other sooner-than-routine requests. These types of problems, however, were uncommon in this sample.
The single largest contributor to PMAES was medical staff failure to "speak up."
More than a third of coding problems involved someone failing to make an input when they had knowledge that might have prevented a tragedy. In one case, a surgeon even requested inputs from his surgical team, but someone still failed to express their concerns. The surgeon in this case was unsure whether the organ he was operating on was the correct one. He asked two surgical nurses if they thought it was the correct organ. One nurse was unsure. This nurse stated there was another surgeon in the facility, and she could page him for clarification. The other nurse did not say anything.
The surgeon decided to remove the tissue, only to find out later that he had removed the wrong organ. In the subsequent investigation, the nurse who remained silent said that she did not think he was removing the correct tissue. However, she did not say anything because, "I don't want to get into trouble." An interesting element to this case was that the physician was well liked and considered "easy to get along with" by other staff. During the assessment and diagnosis, the physician was misled by the patient's youthful appearance and athletic physique. The physician incorrectly diagnosed the patient with an upper respiratory infection. As the patient was leaving the emergency room, he collapsed and died. In this case, the nurse actually wrote a note expressing her concerns.
However, the note was only placed into the patient's chart after the patient died.
This latter example highlights lack of documentation as another problem with written communication. In 42 cases, notes that might have prevented serious injuries were either unclear or nonexistent. In one case, a toddler was misdiagnosed for several months until ultimately physicians discovered she had a brain tumor. A primary cause of this PMAE was that the record gave an unclear description of the child's history. Because several different healthcare providers saw the child during the course of her illness, each provider relied upon the notes of previous providers. Since many of the notes were unclear, each physician appeared to treat the case as a new illness instead of a continuation of a previous problem. Several physicians attributed her "ear aches" to infections, colds, or allergies. Providers discovered and diagnosed her brain tumor only after her condition dramatically changed. By that time it was too late, and the child died.
Three cases involved patient records not being available to healthcare providers.
For example because the medical record was unavailable, a family physician incorrectly assessed a patient with cardiac problems who subsequently died. 2 In the three other cases, records were readily available, yet staff members did not review them.
Team Hierarchical Structures
Team hierarchical structure was associated with PMAES. In examining this frequently between physicians as between nurses and physicians (see Table 2 ). The results of this study confirm previous research reporting that physicians and nurses often have problems communicating. 3 However, current results dispute prior claims of less problematic physician-physician communication. 4 This study indicated that when physicians speak with physicians of different specialties, problems with communication often resulted in PMAES. In all but one of the cases involving physician-physician miscommunication, the interactions involved physicians of different specialties. For example during a medical flight evacuation, a flight surgeon quickly approved transportation of a patient after only a cursory discussion with the attending physician. This attending physician was not well versed on the potential adverse impact of flight on certain medical conditions. Consequently, the patient died in part because of the stresses of flight. 5 The problem, however, did not lay in knowledge or skill deficits of these physicians. Instead, they both should have communicated their concerns about the care of the patient. Incidentally, in this case the nurses and technicians aboard the plane were concerned that the patient was not being properly monitored in flight, but they did not express this concern to the attending physician. She noted that the physician "wouldn't have listened-Once he makes up his mind that's it." During the investigation, a technician was asked if he had "problems" with this physician. The technician replied that on one occasion he brought a concern to this particular physician, but the physician stated, "There are two levels between you and me and you don't talk to me." Needless to say, the technician was then hesitant to provide input in future situations. The morale in this unit was reportedly low.
In another case, eight individuals were involved in the care of a patient who was injured as the result of miscommunication. The investigators noted that staff meetings were poorly attended, and there were a variety of personality conflicts between staff.
It should be noted that high morale in medical units did not necessarily mitigate PMAES. In three cases, the investigator noted very high staff morale.
Time Pressures and Workload
Only two cases involved staff under time pressures or high workload situations, and investigators did not view these factors as causing the PMAES. In one PMAE case, nurses were rushed completing a discharge summary, and consequently they omitted important patient information. In another case, a nurse and physician talked as they rushed to the operating room. Overall, PMAES were not the result of time pressures or high workloads in this current study. 4 Ibid. 5 This case is a good example where either the flight surgeon could be blamed for improperly evaluating the patient or the attending could be held liable since he was the patient's doctor. Neither action, however, answers the more important question of why two highly trained physicians did not do a better job in coordinating the care of the patient.
Notes
Chapter 5 Discussion
The results of this study confirmed that problems with communication are correlated with PMAES. More importantly, this study showed that communication errors are more than some nebulous entity that pervades medicine. These errors can be broken down into various component parts. This study showed that problems of encoding and decoding were significant contributors to PMAES. Although this study could not show that team hierarchical structures caused PMAES, it did indicate that communication between physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers is often problematic. It did find evidence that hostile work environments may play a role in PMAES. Finally, this study found that few PMAES occurred in time pressured or heavy workload environments.
This study suggests several areas that, if improved, could help reduce medical errors.
Team member assertiveness is the most significant area. In more than one third of these cases, team members possessed valuable, even life saving, information that was not shared with other healthcare providers. This fact suggests that medical team members need to be empowered to verbalize their concerns. Combined with the data presented on hostile work environments, this study also suggests that hospital leaders (especially physicians) must facilitate healthy interactive work environments that promote teamwork and allow for inputs from all members. A number of errors occurred in hostile work environments. If errors are to be reduced, hospital leadership must improve relationships and actively work towards eliminating "factioning" of the medical staff.
The current study found that medical events rarely occur because an individual or small group gets rushed. Problems develop over time, often involving a number of different professions. Medical providers must have a "team" focus with all members emphasizing quality and continuity of care. Every patient arriving at a military health care facility must be treated as if they were entering a single unit, not a specific department. This study suggests that teaching general teamwork principles within and between different healthcare facilities will create a safer environment for patients.
Answers from Aviation
Aviation is often cited as a model of improved safety that could be applied to medicine. 1 The conclusion of the IOM authors was that an essential part of creating a safer environment would be to focus on systems and teamwork, and the aviation industry could offer some solutions. 2 Aircrews learn CRM. CRM teaches a set of operational tools that include "inquiry, seeking relevant operational information, advocacy, communicating proposed actions, conflict resolution, and decision making. Both programs hold some promise. The problem with applying CRM to medical settings is that CRM has never been empirically demonstrated to reduce aviation mishaps. 7 Additionally, MedTeams assumes that medical errors are committed in high workload, time pressured environments. However, as this research has shown, few PMAES in USAF settings occur in these circumstances. On the other hand, MTM teaches broader communication skills, which is consistent with the results and recommendations of this study.
Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. First, not all of the cases contained PMAES, and in some cases it was debatable whether the adverse event could have been prevented. 8 In addition the reliance upon malpractice cases and MII files meant that this investigator was essentially getting the information "second," even "third" hand.
Therefore, the information for this study relied upon the investigative skills of those who conducted the initial investigations.
In addition, the communication barriers included in this study were limited. No consideration was given to the possibility that the healthcare professionals interviewed for the investigations gave patently false information. Making false statements would not be surprising considering the liability involved in malpractice cases.
Another limitation of this study is that it did not have a control group. Therefore, no
comparison between communication problems in PMAES and non-PMAES was possible.
It is conceivable that there is no significant difference between the amounts of communication problems in these two different groups.
Given the parameters of this study, malpractice cases were less helpful than MII cases. Because malpractice cases concern legal questions of negligence, the focus was less on systems and more on individual culpability. 
Future Research
Malpractice cases and MII were not designed as research tools. There is wide variability in the data documented in these records, depending on the nature of the case and the individuals conducting the investigations. In addition, this researcher recommends more research in general on the role of communication in medical errors. This study has only touched the surface of this problem, and further research is needed.
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